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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A ROBIN HOOD
HIRING POLICY IN FEDERALLY
AIDED CONSTRUCTION
Frederick W. Lambert*
I. Introduction
Executive Order 11246,1 promulgated in September 1965, requires that
all federal financial aid applicants incorporate into construction contracts
and sub-contracts the same guarantees of equal employment opportunity
that are required of parties in a direct contractual relationship with the
government.2 Each contractor must "take affirmative action to ensure that
[job] applicants are employed . ..and treated during employment" in a
nondiscriminatory manner 3 and must guarantee that his subcontractors will
also take such affirmative action. 4 Responsibility for enforcement of the
Order was delegated to the newly-established Office of Federal Contract
Compliance (OFCC).5 The OFCC drafted guidelines 6 requiring contrac-
tors and major subcontractors to submit pre-award plans of affirmative
action that would "have the result of assuring ...minority group repre-
sentation in all trades .. . and in all phases of the work." 7 Weiner v.
Cuyohoga Community Colleges is the first case in which the validity of
these guidelines has been contested.
In early 1968, a mechanical contractor, who was bidding for pipefitting
work on a federally assisted construction project in Cleveland, Ohio, sub-
mitted a detailed plan of affirmative action with the following caveat:
*Mr. Lambert is a member of the Editorial Board of Prospectus. He would like to
thank Wilbur J. Markstrom of the Ohio bar for his kind assistance.
t 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965). The Order was amended by Executive Order 11375
(1967), which substituted the word "religion" for "creed" and added sex as a
prohibited basis of discrimination.
2 Id. § 301.
3 Id. § 202.
4 Id. § 202(7) requires the contractor to include in his subcontracts the same affirma-
tive action requirements by which he is bound.
5 Secretary's Order No. 26-65, 31 Fed. Reg. 6921 (1966).
631 Fed. Reg. 6881 (1966); 32 Fed. Reg. 7439 (1967). These rules were again
amended in mid-1968. See 33 Fed. Reg. 7804 (1968).
7 Memorandum of May 24, 1967 from Vincent G. Macaluso, Ass't. Dir. of the OFCC
for Construction, to all agency compliance officers.
8 15 Ohio Misc. 298, 238 N.E.2d 839 (1968) aff'd September 16, 1968, by Ohio
Court of Appeals, petition for certification to Supreme Court of Ohio filed,
November 2, 1968. The author has spoken to Mr. Charles Doneghy, the Con-
tract Compliance Officer in Cleveland. Mr. Doneghy suggested that the govern-
ment would require the college to appeal any adverse decision.
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"Subject to Availability and Referral . . .of Qualified Journeymen and
Apprentices from Pipefitters Local 120."9 The aid recipient, Cuyahoga Com-
munity College, rejected the contractor's low bid on the ground that the plan,
because of its conditional language, failed to comply with the guidelines
enunciated by the OFCC and the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment. 10 Suit was instituted to compel acceptance of the bid; the plaintiff
contended that "assurances of minority representation"" meant that he was
required to guarantee a quota of minority workers in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,12 which forbids discrimination in hiring on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The Ohio Court of
Common Pleas held that the evidence did not establish that the government
or the college had required an illegal quota.13 Moreover, it refused to equate
"assurances of minority representation" with a guarantee that minority work-
ers would be hired regardless of qualification.
The court did not have to analyze the statutory and constitutional limi-
tations on affirmative action. The weak factual case presented by the
plaintiff allowed the court to base its decision on narrow evidentiary
grounds. It did not discuss the possibility that other more demanding
affirmative action guidelines might violate the Civil Rights Act. 14 In
9 The contractor had an exclusive union hall hiring agreement that required him to
accept only pipefitters supplied by Local 120 located in Cleveland. The college
contended that both OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §153.591 (Page 1965) and the
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT of 1964 invalidated such an agreement because the union was
engaging in discriminatory hiring practices. The court did not analyze the
plaintiff's response to this argument, which asserted the unconstitutionality of the
Ohio statute, because it was able to decide the case on a narrower evidentiary
ground. See text accompanying note 16 inlra.
10 See generally 1968 CCH Employment Practices 1 8229.
1 See note 3 supra.
1242 U.S.C. §2000e(2)(j) (1964). It should be noted that Title VII of the ACT,
which includes the anti-preference section, does not include federal or state
governments in its definition of "employer." Id. §2000e(l). Thus it could be
argued that the federal government could follow a preferential hiring policy
and not be in violation of the statute. Such a hiring policy might violate the
"due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment. This is discussed at 193 infra.
13 The court stated that "... the evidence does not show that the College set up
any ratio between Caucasian and any minority group or that it required the low
bidder to guarantee to maintain such [a] thing - a ratio quota system." 15 Ohio
Misc. at 297-98, 238 N.E.2d at 844.
14 However, by negative implication, the court seemed to acknowledge the possibility
of a conflict with the CIVIL RIGHTS ACT of 1964.
In this case, the evidence fails to show that
the College or any federal official has required
"preferential treatment for any individual or
any group for the purpose of achieving racial
balance." [Citing the Cong. Record, April 8,
1964 at 6986.] Ohio Misc. at 298, 238
N.E.2d at 845.
[Vol. 2:1
Affirmative Action
addition, the court was not compelled to treat the more vexing question
whether guidelines not in direct conflict with the statute might, neverthe-
less, be beyond the executive authority of the President15 or in violation
of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.1 6 This article will
attempt to present a more fundamental analysis of the extent to which
affirmative action is permissible to redress the present unequal condition
of many minority citizens that has been caused by discriminatory hiring
practices in existence before the passage of the Civil Rights Act.
Besides providing a factual context within which to discuss these broader
questions, Weiner illustrates the weaknesses of the present procedure by
which the government's policy of equal employment opportunity is en-
forced. The Executive Order places a major portion of the enforcement
burden on contractors who, as federal aid recipients, are required to guar-
antee their subcontractor's compliance with the Order and the relevant
OFCC guidelines.' 7 It will be argued that direct government enforcement
of affirmative action would be more equitable to poorer aid applicants, less
costly to the government, and more efficient in terms of gaining maximum
compliance with the guidelines.
I. Non-Discrimination: The Civil Rights Act of 1964
By passing Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,'s Congress responded
to the need for equal employment opportunity in hiring, promotion, and
training of employees by private industrial employers engaged in interstate
commerce. 1 9 Labor organizations and employment agencies were also re-
quired to observe the general nondiscrimination provisions of the Act.20
Notwithstanding the comprehensiveness of the statute, it can be argued
that it contained two important shortcomings that lessened its effectiveness
in correcting the evils of past discrimination and enforcing the newly
enunciated policy of equal employment opportunity.
First, the Act did not delegate "cease and desist" powers to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the administrative tri-
bunal that was formed to hear complaints and investigate charges of dis-
criminatory practices. 2 ' Instead, the Act merely permitted the EEOC to
15 See text at 192 infra.
16 See text at 193 intra.
17 See note 4 supra.
Is42 U.S.C. §2000e (1964).
A9 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 2355.
2042 U.S.C. §2000e (1964).
21 As drafted, the bill had delegated to the EEOC cease and desist power to correct
discriminatory employment practices. This feature was severely criticized and
finally dropped.
Recent attempts to amend the CIVIL RIGHTS ACT to give the EEOC cease and
desist power have been blocked by bi-partisan opposition. Sen. Dirksen described
the bill (S. 1026 introduced by Sen. Hart on Feb. 21, 1967) as "one of the
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"endeavor to eliminate any . . . unlawful employment practice by informal
methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion." 22 However, it did
provide that a private party alleging a discriminatory practice could in-
stitute suit against an employer who rejected a suggested form of volun-
tary compliance. 23 In such an action, the court could appoint counsel for
the complainant if necessary and could allow intervention by the Attorney
General if the case were of "general public importance." 2 4 Furthermore,
if an employer refused to obey a court order, the Commission could
institute suit in its own name to seek compliance.2 5
Although the EEOC reported a substantial increase in the number of
successfully conciliated complaints during the latter months of 1967, those
cases reaching the courts seemed to underscore the barriers that confronted
an individual in attempting to compel an intransigent employer to observe
the terms of the Act.2 6 President Johnson, in early 1968, urged passage
of a bill introduced by Senator Philip H. Hart that would enable the Com-
mission to issue cease and desist orders after an appropriate hearing.27
Bi-partisan opposition makes future enactment improbable.2 s
The second shortcoming of the Civil Rights Act was its anti-preferential
treatment section, 2 9 which can be read to limit executive authority for
most offensive pieces of legislation that could come before Congress." BNA,
Labor Policy and Practice, Bulletin to Management No. 955 at 2, (1968).
As another indication of Congressional feeling toward the EEOC, the House
reduced President Johnson's request for funds from $13.1 million to $6.9
million. EEOC Chairman Clifford Alexander commented that such action, unless
corrected, would "make a mockery of this Nation's commitment to equal em-
ployment opportunity." Id. at 2.
2242 U.S.C. §2000e(5) (1964).
23 d. at §2000e(5)(e) (1964).
24 Id.
251d. at §2000e(5)(i) (1964).
26See generally Press Release by EEOC Chairman Clifford Alexander, January 10,
1968 CCH Employment Practices 8216.
27Excerpts from a speech to Congress on January 24, 1968 CCH Employment
Practices 8225.
2 SSee note 21 supra.
2942 U.S.C. §2000e(2)(j) (1964):
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be
interpreted to require any employer, employ-
ment agency, labor organization, or joint labor
management committee subject to this sub-
chapter to grant preferential treatment to any
individual, or to any group because of the race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin of such
individual or group on account of an imbalance
which may exist with respect to the total num-
ber or percentage of persons of any race, color,
religion, sex or national origin employed by any
employer, referred or classified by any labor
organization, or admitted to, or employed in,
any apprenticeship or other training program,
[Vol. 2:1
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vigorous affirmative action guidelines. This provision negated the possibility
of any interpretation of the Act that would require, as a means of rectifying
racial imbalances, any hiring of minority persons based upon percentage
composition of an employer's work force in comparison to minority repre-
sentation in the population. 3 0 Together with the blanket nondiscrimination
provision of the Act, the anti-preference section seemed to manifest Con-
gressional disapproval of compensatory hiring by any "employer" as defined
by Title VII.31
The results of decades of discrimination against minority citizens could
hardly be altered by the tepid EEOC enforcement provisions and the in-
sertion of the anti-preference section must have made the Civil Rights Act
seem a token advance, if not a Pyrrhic victory, to minority leaders. Having
been denied the opportunity to develop skills for so long, how could their
people now be expected to compete with non-minority citizens on an equal
basis?32 It is understandable that to some the Act must have seemed, at
best, a feeble attack on entrenched discrimination, at worst, legalization of
a policy that would further solidify a quasi-caste system. 33
in comparison with the total number or percent-
age of persons of such race, color, creed, sex or
national origin in any community, State, section,
or other area, or in the available work force in
the community, State, section, or other area.
30 Although no court has so held, the anti-preference section could be read as
eliminating any interpretation that would permit the government to require pref-
erential hiring even if it were not based upon a strict population or work force
quota. The legislative history, supra note 21, seems to support such an inter-
pretation.
31 Cf. Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Org., 34 Ill.2d 257, 215 N.E.2d 443
(1966). (Demand that employer hire eight Negroes is contrary to state and
federal law and enjoinable.) It should be noted that Title VI of the ACT,
governing federally assisted projects, contains a general anti-discrimination
provision. (42 U.S.C. §2000d(3)). This would seem to preclude the government
from permitting or requiring discrimination on a federally assisted jobsite.
32 See generally Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro
- The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966). Animad-
verters of the antipreference section argued that inequality caused by intentional
injustice should be compensated; it would be unjust, they reasoned, to treat
unequals equally when they were not to blame for their status. Analogies were
made to compensatory treatment given to other disadvantaged members of
society, such as the physically handicapped. Anti-preference forces rejoined that
Robin Hood tactics with job opportunity would punish those least to blame for
the evil effects of discrimination, in addition to perpetuating classification ac-
cording to race. This response carried the day.
33 See generally Michigan Construction Industry Study summarized in 1968 CCH
Employment Practices 8115. See also 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS
2513-17. These studies show a high disparity between minority population repre-
sentation and percentage of minority unemployment in all job categories. It
would seem logical to assume that many of these people would be unable to
compete successfully for jobs with nonminority applicants because of prior dis-
crimination that excluded them from training and job experience.
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III. "Affirmative Action": Executive Order 11246
and OFCC Guidelines
A. Obligations under Present Guidelines
In contrast to the recent legislative concern for equal employment oppor-
tunity, the executive branch, since 1941, has required contractors and
suppliers of the federal government to undertake to eliminate discriminatory
hiring practices.3 4 A succession of executive orders gradually extended the
coverage of the original mandate to all federally assisted construction
projects. 35
As a means of deepening government involvement in the enforcement
of nondiscrimination by federal contractors and aid recipients, Executive
Order 1124636 delegated administration of this policy to the Secretary of
Labor,37 who in turn established the OFCC. In 1966-67, the OFCC,
through the Secretary of Labor, published compliance guidelines. 38 In ad-
dition, certain geographic areas of the country were designated by the
Director of the OFCC for "pre-award compliance reviews." 39 The purpose
of this designation was "to produce more meaningful and consistent affirm-
ative actions by contractors." 40 At these pre-award meetings contractors
were to present detailed plans of affirmative action as required by the
terms of Executive Order 11246.41 In the words of one OFCC memoran-
dum, affirmative action should "have the result of assuring that there is
minority group representation in all trades on the job in all phases of the
work." 4 2
The words affirmative action were not new. They had been incorpo-
rated verbatim into the Johnson order from an earlier Executive Order
issued by President Kennedy. 4 3 However, it seemed from the language of
some of its memoranda that the OFCC intended to use a more vigorous
interpretation of this language as a focal point for requiring increased re-
cruitment and training of minority workers.
The regulations of the OFCC permitted the individual departments of
the executive branch to articulate their own specific suggestions for affirm-
34 Executive Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
35 Executive Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
36 See notes 1 through 4 supra.
37 The Sec. of Labor retained rule-making power for the OFCC under § 201 of
Executive Order No. 11246, 31 Fed. Reg. 6881, 6882 (1966).3 8 See note 6 supra.
39 As to designation of areas, OFCC Director Edward C. Sylvester, Jr., in a Feb.
10, 1967 memorandum to all heads of agencies stated that, "The Cleveland,
Ohio area, in addition to the San Francisco Bay Area, St. Louis, and another
undetermined city, have been selected."
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Executive Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
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ative action, subject to OFCC approval. 4 4 On July 10, 1967, the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development issued instructions for contrac-
tors that would be dealing directly with any of its agencies or bidding on
its assisted projects. 45 The directive restated the requirement of a written
pre-award program in those geographical areas designated by the OFCC
and suggested a nine point outline of affirmative action. It suggested that
a written policy of equal employment opportunity be distributed to all
employees. In addition, a top management official was to be appointed to
co-ordinate the specifics of the written program and "serve as a focal point
for hearing complaints."4 6 The suggested written policy included recruit-
ment and training programs directed toward living areas and schools having
substantial minority populations. Apprenticeship and training were to be
used "to help equalize opportunity for minority persons." 4 7 This could be
done by "sponsoring and assisting minority youths as well as others ...
to enter training." [Emphasis added]48 The careful wording sought to
avoid an interpretation that preferential treatment was to be accorded to
minority groups. Nevertheless, it seemed clear that an acceptable plan of
affirmative action would have to be vigorous enough to result in a sig-
nificant increase in minority promotion and hiring.
On May 27, 1968 the Secretary of Labor issued new guidelines for the
OFCC that significantly increased the specificity with which federal con-
tractors and aid recipients were to assure affirmative action. 49 These
guidelines were to become effective on July 1, 1968. Most controversial
was the language that provided:
The contractors' programs should provide
in detail for specific steps to guarantee
equal employment opportunity keyed to
problems and needs of members of minor-
ity groups, including, when there are de-
ficiencies, the development of specific goals
and time tables for the prompt achieve-
ment of full and equal employment op-
portunity. [Emphasis added]50
Even before the guidelines became effective, two powerful trade associ-
ations, the Associated General Contractors 51 and the National Association
of Manufacturers, 52 suggested that
44 1968 CCH Employment Practices 8229.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 33 Fed. Reg. 7804 (1968).
5Old. at 7811.
51 1968 CCH Employment Practices 8241.
52 Id. at 8253.
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this OFCC regulation . . . would seem to
require that an employer do specifically
what cannot be required of him by stat-
ute.5 3
The contractors' association resolved to "exercise its persuasive powers,
legal rights, and initiate legislation if necessary, to oppose implementation
of unauthorized and unlawful pre-award orders." 54 This statement sug-
gests that the statutory and constitutional limitations on affirmative ac-
tion, as required by the Executive Order and interpreted by the OFCC,
will probably have to be clarified by the courts.
B. Limitations on More Demanding Guidelines
1. Statutory Limitations: Conflict With The Civil Rights Act
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act forbids any form of discrimination on
racial or ethnic grounds in hiring.5 5 It states that it shall not be interpreted
to require redress of extant racial imbalances. 5 6 Thus the OFCC could not
require federal aid applicants to hire or train a specific number or percen-
tage of its employees from minority groups. However, affirmative action
is not necessarily synonymous with preferential treatment. The undecided
question is how far the affirmative action requirement can be extended
before it is said to constitute preferential treatment.
Weiner provides some insight on this question, for it held that the pre-
award submission of a "manning table",57 a statistical abstract of proposed
minority representation, could not be interpreted as a quota requirement
in violation of the Civil Rights Act. 58 The court quoted at length from a
recent case 5 9 that interpreted Executive Order 11246 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act as forbidding the use of a seniority system that reflected
discrimination in years before the passage of the Act:
We cannot accept the Union's contention
that such discrimination is not prohibited
• ..and that Title VII cannot be used in
any way to alter or affect seniority sys-
53 Id.
54 Id. at 8241.
55 42 U.S.C. §2000e(2) (a) ( I ) (1964).
56 42 U.S.C. §2000e(2)(a)(1) (1964).
57 The trial court found that a manning table was "... simply a list of the proposed
total number of pipefitters for the College's job, listed by month and year, and
showing the number of Negroes who would be on the job. It would just as well
be called a 'Hiring List' or a 'Number of Men on the Job Table.'" 15 Ohio
Misc. 294, 238 N.E.2d at 842.
)s 15 Ohio Misc. 289, 238 N.E.2d 839 (1968).
59 United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers, 282 F. Supp.
39 (E.D. La. 1968).
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tems. Where a seniority system has the
effect of perpetrating discrimination, and
concentrating or 'telescoping' the effect of
past years of discrimination against Negro
employees into the present placement of
Negroes in an inferior position for promo-
tion and other purposes, that present re-
sult is prohibited, and a seniority system
which operates to produce that present re-
sult must be replaced with another sys-
tem. We agree wholeheartedly with the
conclusion in Quarles v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968)
that present discrimination cannot be jus-
tified under Title VII simply because Title
VII refers to an effective date and be-
cause present discrimination is caused by
conditions in the past. 'Congress did not
intend to freeze an entire generation of
Negro employees into discriminatory pat-
terns that existed before the act.' Quarles,
supra, at 516. [Emphasis added]60
The Quarles case relied on by the court did not involve a government
contractor or aid recipient; thus Quarles required corrective action solely
on the basis of the Civil Rights Act and did not seek support from Execu-
tive Order 11246. The question then arises: To what extent can an Exec-
utive Order legitimately require some form of affirmative action beyond
that required by the Quarles interpretation of Title VII?
It is clear that any policy of the executive department that required the
hiring of minority workers over better qualified non-minority workers
would violate the provisions of Title VII.61 In some instances, however,
there are no non-minority applicants. For example, in Weiner a short-
age of pipefitters suggested the absence of white applicants for these
jobs.62 Therefore, the hiring of minority applicants would not have been
discriminatory. In such cases it would seem possible for an Executive
Order to require the hiring of minority personnel. Although the legislative
history of Title VII convincingly excludes any implication that a minority
group or individual 63 can demand jobs from an employer covered by the
60 15 Ohio Misc. 289, 299. 238 N.E.2d 839, 845-46 (1968).
6142 U.S.C. §2000e(2)(a) (1964).
62 Memorandum of Edward C. Sylvester, Jr., OFCC Director, of March 15, 1967
to all Agency Compliance Officers.
63 See generally the legislative history at 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 2391
et seq.
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Act, the language of the statute does not seem to preclude an employer
from acceding to such a demand and contracting to hire minority person-
nel if there is no discrimination against more qualified job applicants.
One state administrative tribunal has accepted this theory and has ordered
the hiring of six minority applicants under a requirement of affirmative
action similar to that of Executive Order 11246.64 A union argument
that such a requirement was discriminatory was rejected by the New York
Human Rights Commission because of the absence of white job applicants.
2. Constitutional Limitations
(a) Scope Of Executive Authority
The scope of the President's authority may also limit the kind of
affirmative action that can be required by way of Executive Orders or
guidelines issued pursuant to them. Before the enactment of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, commentators had some difficulty in pinpointing authority
for the numerous orders requiring incorporation of nondiscrimination
clauses into federal contracts. One observed that the absence of "challenge
... of this authority by four presidents in nine executive orders over twenty
years lends support to Presidential power to prescribe nondiscrimination,
at least until Congress acts." 65 As Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer
points out, the President's power to require affirmative action may be de-
rived from two sources:
The ... power, if any, to issue an order
must stem either from an act of Congress
or from the Constitution itself.6 6
In other words, it may be implied from his authority to enforce the Civil
Rights Act or from his inherent power as chief executive. It was suggested
above that the President could not demand affirmative action that would
constitute preferential treatment and therefore violate the nondiscrimina-
tion provisions of the Civil Rights Act.6 7 Therefore the limit imposed on
affirmative action depends on whether the sum of his implied powers
allows him to demand any action as long as it does not constitute pref-
erential treatment or whether his authority ceases at some point short of
direct conflict with the Act.
The more stringent limitation on executive power would posit a con-
ceptual vacuum in which the President could not order affirmative ac-
64 Miller v. Holly, 1968 CCH Employment Practices 8206 (New York State Com-
mission for Human Rights).
65 Speck, Enforcement of Nondiscrimination Requirements for Government Contract
Work, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 243 (1963). This article contains a thorough discus-
sion of all Executive Orders relevant to this topic.
66 342 U.S. 579, 585 (1962).
67 See text at 190 supra.
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tion, even though it did not directly conflict with the nondiscrimination
section of Title VII. Such a theory would also postulate, on the basis of
Youngstown, that Congress did not intend to delegate power to the Presi-
dent to take all reasonable action that was not in conflict with nondiscrimi-
nation provisions. The Quarles case, cited earlier in a quotation by the
Weiner court, and the failure to question the legality of past orders on
employment opportunity in federal contracting seem to discredit this
theory.6s Moreover, there are independent policy reasons why any order
not in direct conflict with the statute should be found to be valid. Greater
certainty results from promulgating guidelines and requiring a form of pre-
award review of compliance because the risk of costly suspensions of work
is reduced. This might have the further advantage of reducing litigation
between private parties and the government.
(b) Due Process Considerations
Perhaps it is overly speculative to discuss substantive due process con-
siderations under the present OFCC guidelines. Although the right to hold
specific private employment has been held by the Supreme Court to be pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment as a form of "liberty" and "property" in Green
v. McElroy,69 it is hard to envision an extension of that decision to include the
right of a citizen to freedom from interference with his access to job opportu-
nity information. It would be equally difficult to argue that due process in
the public sector requires the federal government to insure dissemination of
such information to all citizens. Nevertheless, the nature of such arguments
is outlined below to suggest a mode for analyzing future guidelines that
might raise more serious substantive due process questions. For example,
could the President, pursuant to his broad powers as commander-in-chief,
order compensatory discrimination in hiring by private employers on
military bases? Could he, under the same authority, require such private
establishments to discharge nonminority personnel and hire minority appli-
cants to redress racial imbalance? It is, of course, doubtful that such orders
would ever be issued. Nevertheless, recent OFCC activity indicates that
ftutre guidelines might raise similar due process questions.
One approach to the problem is suggested by two recent school deseg-
regation cases. In Hobson v. Hansen, a far-reaching program of court-
ordered integration was said to be constitutionally required to redress racial
imbalance in the District of Columbia public schools.70 In seeming contra-
diction, Alabama State Teachers Association v. Alabama Public School
and College Authority held that affirmative action of the kind required
in Hobson was not constitutionally compelled in higher education because
such education, unlike preparatory schooling, is neither compulsory nor
OS See text at 192-93 supra.
69360 U.S. 474 (1959).
70 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) per S. Wright, Circuit J.
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guaranteed as a matter of right. 7 1 The court did not discuss whether the
college officials involved could have chosen to act affirmatively, but pre-
sumably they could have. For the purposes of analyzing Executive Order
11246 the more important question goes a step beyond the assumption
that the college could have acted affirmatively. To what extent could the
Alabama officials have acted affirmatively and, by analogy, to what extent
could the President require similar affirmative action on federally assisted
projects?
The question posed might arise in the following factual context. A non-
minority laborer, X, might complain that but for affirmative action he
would have been hired because he was better qualified than some of the
minority applicants that were hired. 72 To recover he would have to show
that affirmative action deprived him of knowledge of opportunity that he
otherwise would have had if the employer had not redirected his usual
program of job advertisement.
Because an employer has limited funds for advertisement and recruit-
ment, he must necessarily choose where these resources are to be utilized.
As part of an affirmative action plan, he might choose to recruit and
advertise in areas predominantly populated by minority groups. Assume
that there were well-established channels of communications that he aban-
doned to permit alternative affirmative action advertising. Would a shift in
advertising from newspaper A, with a high non-minority readership, to
newspaper B, distributed predominantly in the ghettos, create a right under
the due process clause in X, a regular reader of the non-minority paper,
to question the legality of affirmative action?
X probably cannot rely on the Hobson case to question the legality of
such affirmative action under the due process clause. Even if the court
recognized a right to knowledge of employment opportunity on federally
aided projects, this right could not be equated with the fundamental right
to equality in public preparatory schooling, for employment on federally
assisted projects is neither compulsory nor guaranteed as a matter of right.
This reasoning, derived from the Alabama State Teacher's case, would
require the conclusion that the government is not constitutionally com-
pelled under the due process clause to disseminate news of public job
opportunities equally, even if its failure to do so might favor a minority
group over a non-minority group.
Greene might suggest that X could claim an unconstitutional inter-
ference with his liberty or property, but it is relevant authority only if X
can show a vested right that has been encroached upon by affirmative
action. 73 It held that the due process clause protects the right to pursue
71-F. Supp.-37 U.S.L.W. 2101 (D.C. Ala. Aug. 28, 1968).
72 Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The petitioner would seem to be able to
show an individual interest sufficient to meet the standing requirements.
73 See note 69 and accompanying text, supra.
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specific private employment.7 4 However, that reasoning seems to assume
that the right to a job matures after hiring. Before hiring, a man need
only be considered on merit when and if he applies. It would seem to be
an unwarranted extension of Greene to create a vested "right to know"
about job opportunities that would invalidate affirmative action. In addi-
tion, there would seem to be strong reasons favoring a restrictive interpre-
tation of Greene. In that case the exclusion from the employment market
was much broader than the exclusion of laborer X from a single job.
Claiming that affirmative action has illegally excluded him from a job,
X can recover only by showing that he has superior qualifications and
should have been hired. However, if he can show superiority, he can
probably also obtain alternative employment.
If an OFCC directive required such vigorous affirmative action that sub-
stantive due process issues were raised, it would also seem vulnerable to an
attack based upon the nondiscrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act.
However, in the related context of direct federal employment, Title VII
would not apply because the federal government is excluded from its
definition of "employer"; thus greater reliance would have to be placed
on a Hobson or Greene argument.
IV. Criticism Of Enforcement Procedure
The procedural posture of Weiner illustrates some of the inequities that
result from requiring aid recipients to enforce affirmative action. The real
dispute was between the union, which was allegedly engaging in a dis-
criminatory hiring practice, and the government, which was seeking to
carry out the terms of Executive Order 11246. Yet the suit that resulted
was between the federal aid applicant and the president of the contracting
company, who sued as a taxpayer to compel acceptance of his company's
low bid. The trial court in Weiner alluded to the burdens placed upon
applicants for federal aid by the enforcement provisions of Executive Order
11246:
Under the statutes the College was bound
by the provisions of the law. Clearly the
federal government was bound to endorse
equal employment by the College. The
College also had to follow the federal di-
rective and reject Reliance's bid because
Reliance had equivocated and tried to
pass the buck to Pipefitters Local #120.
It is unfortunate that the College and
Reliance are caught in the middle. 7 5
74 Green v. McElroy, supra note 69 at 492-493.
75 15 Ohio Misc. at 296, 238 N.E.2d at 843.
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The College's decision to reject the bid was not difficult, for Reliance had
clearly failed to meet government standards. Nevertheless, the College had
to bear the cost of litigation to defend its decision. Moreover, it was ex-
posed to a potentially expensive work stoppage.
A federal aid recipient is placed in a dilemma if he is unsure whether
a contractor or subcontractor will comply with its affirmative action pro-
gram. If the recipient rejects a low bid, he is vulnerable to a costly suit
to compel acceptance. However, if he accepts the bid, he may be risking
a suspension of federal aid because his subcontractors may fail to comply
with their affirmative action program. 7 6 Similarly, a small subcontractor
with an exclusive union hall hiring agreement may risk a breach of contract
action if he determines that compliance with affirmative action requires
rejection of workers from a local that engages in discriminatory practices. 77
The burdens of enforcement seem arbitrarily to favor the more finan-
cially independent federal aid applicants and similarly situated subcontrac-
tors. Because of their size, they are better able to insure compliance by
procuring alternative sources of labor; in addition, they can better absorb
the cost of litigation and work stoppage. Although it is doubtful whether
these considerations would deter small political subdivisions and contrac-
tors from applying for federal aid or bidding on projects, it is at least
arguable that they should not be required to shoulder the disproportionate
burdens of litigation. Moreover, it would seem more economical to have
the government directly enforce affirmative action rather than indirectly
pay the cost through the federal aid recipient. The specialized staff of the
Department of Justice could probably handle the case more efficiently from
its inception and it would seem that the spectre of direct government inter-
vention might serve as a strong incentive toward voluntary compliance.
Currently there are two sections of the Executive Order that provide for
intervention by the United States Attorney General. When two private
parties are involved in litigation, the Attorney General may intervene to
protect the interests of the United States. In addition, when an applicant
fails to comply with guidelines of an administrating agency, the agency may
". .. refer the case to the Department of Justice for appropriate legal
proceedings." 7 S In actions brought under the latter section, the procedures
for termination or suspension of federal aid under the Civil Rights Act of
1964 are to be followed. 7 :9 It does not appear that the OFCC has invoked
76 See note 4 supra.
77 The plaintiff in Weiner argued that the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT gave
him the right to contract for a single source of labor, notwithstanding the pro-
visions of the CIVIL RIGHTs ACT and the Executive Order. The Court rejected
this argument on the ground that Congress showed its intent to have prior
legislation read in light of the anti-discrimination provision of the CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT of 1964.
78 Executive Order No. 11246, §§ 202(6) and 209(2), 30 Fed. Reg. 12319, 12320,
12322 (1965).
7 9 Id.
[Vol. 2:1
Affirmative Action
this section of the Executive Order. However, the hearing procedure for
termination set out in the text of the Order has been invoked recently
against five large companies who are accused of engaging in discriminatory
employment practicess 0 This enforcement pattern suggests that the Depart-
ment of Labor has chosen to avoid the courts.8 1
A greater involvement of the federal government in enforcement seems
required to avoid the apparent unfairness and diseconomy of the present
procedure. Perhaps it would be less burdensome and more economical to
allow an aid recipient to request intervention by the Attorney General when
the recipient is involved in litigation as a result of a good faith effort to
assure the implementation of affirmative action guidelines. As an alterna-
tive, a cost-sharing section might be added to the current Executive Order
that would partially reimburse private parties for litigation that did not
directly involve enforcement of affirmative action but arose as a conse-
quence of it. Under such a provision the college, in the Weiner case, could
have asked for the intervention of the Attorney General to defend its re-
jection of the bid. Other parties, such as labor unions, might be joined
under the section of the Civil Rights Act that allows the Attorney General
to bring a civil action to compel compliance with the Act.
A contractor or subcontractor, who is receiving aid indirectly through
a federally assisted bidder should also be able to request intervention of
the Justice Department to enforce the terms of the Executive Order. In
cases that do not involve an attempt to enforce affirmative action but arise
from rescission of a subcontract for non-compliance, the contractor should
be partially compensated for his costs. In addition, when a party antici-
pates breaking a contract with a contractor or subcontractor on the grounds
that the latter has not complied with his affirmative action obligations, that
party should be required to give notice to the Attorney General. The
government could then choose either to intervene in a subsequent defense
of any damage claim arising from the breach of the contract or to com-
pensate the private party's defense of such action. The government would
probably choose to intervene if it could join a claim against the contractor
or subcontractor under the Civil Rights Act, which authorizes civil suit
by the Justice Department. It should be emphasized that government
80 Bethlehem Steel Corp., Bethlehem, Pa.; Timken Roller Bearing Co., Canton, Ohio;
Allen-Bradley Co., Milwaukee, Wis.; B & D Motor Express Co., Pittsburgh, Pa.;
Pullman, Inc., Bessemer, Ala. See 1968 CCH Employment Practices Report 72,
July 25, 1968, p. 5.
Professor Dallas Young of Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland was
appointed to a three member board to determine whether Timken Roller Bear-
ing was in compliance with Executive Order 11246. Prof. Young indicated in a
telephone interview on Sept. 25, 1968, that the hearings, which had been sched-
uled for August 1968, would probably not be held until the early months of 1969.
St A number of Contract Compliance Officers suggested that more "affirmative ac-
tion" cases would be brought in the near future. They were unwilling to com-
ment on the procedural posture in which the cases might arise.
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assistance in any form would always be conditioned upon the good faith
of aid recipients and their contractors.
V. Conclusion
Although affirmative action under Executive Order 11246 has been
interpreted to require contractors and subcontractors on federally assisted
projects to institute vigorous programs of recruitment and training, neither
the nondiscrimination sections of the Civil Rights Act nor the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment seem to be violated. Moreover, the author-
ity for the President to order such action as a prerequisite to receiving
federal aid would seem to be derivable from either Title VII of the Act or
the inherent power of the chief executive.
It is unclear how far affirmative action can be extended as a prerequisite
to federal construction assistance, but the three limitations discussed above
suggest a broad discretion on the part of the President. The Civil Rights
Act provides one limitation, for it cannot be thought to delegate power
to the President to require compensatory discrimination for minority
groups. However, it is doubtful that the scope of his implied power to
demand affirmative action is so circumscribed that it would restrict all
further expansion of affirmative action. Moreover, it is doubtful whether
affirmative action in its present form can be thought to raise substantive
due process problems. As in the recent Alabama case holding that affirma-
tive desegregatory action was not constitutionally required in higher edu-
cation, employment on government-aided projects is neither compulsory
nor guaranteed as a matter of right. Furthermore, the right to knowledge of
recruitment programs cannot be considered to be on the same plane as the
right to hold specific private employment without government interference.
It should be noted, however, that the due process argument provides the
only basis for recovery when the government is the employer because the
nondiscrimination sections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act do not apply.
Enforcement provisions, as demonstrated by the Weiner case, place a
disproportionate burden on small federal aid recipients and similarly situ-
ated bidders for federally aided projects. In addition, they are uneconomi-
cal and procedurally unwieldy. One solution to this problem would be the
amendment of the Executive Order to allow a party to request government
intervention in enforcement litigation or to require the government to share
the cost of other court action caused by good faith attempts to insure
compliance with government guidelines. This would be in line with the
general policy of allocating the cost of enforcing executive guidelines to
the federal government.
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